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RICHARD MICHAEL F ISCHL

“Running the Government Like a Business”:
Wisconsin and the Assault on Workplace
Democracy
introduction: democratic spring
The news is filled with reports of democratic movements challenging
authoritarian rule in the Middle East and elsewhere, prompting a nigh
unanimous outpouring of support from across the American political
spectrum. But a conflict much closer to home—the crisis in Wisconsin and a
growing number of states over collective bargaining rights for public-sector
workers—has produced a more mixed and complex reaction. To be sure,
most polls suggest that a majority of Americans opposes efforts by
Republican-dominated state governments to strip public-sector employees
of their bargaining rights.1 But a sizeable minority supports those efforts,2

1.

2.

See, e.g., Doug Mataconis, Have Republicans Lost the Public Relations War over
Public Sector Unions?, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (Mar. 3, 2011), http://
www.outsidethebeltway.com/have-republicans-lost-the-public-relations-war-over-public
-sector-unions (analyzing three public opinion surveys—a CBS/New York Times poll, a
NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll, and a Rasmussen poll—and concluding that
“Americans remain strongly supportive of unionism in general and the idea of the right
to collective bargain with one’s employer, even when that employer happens to be the
government”); Ohio Women Lead in Disapproval of New Governor, QUINNIPIAC UNIV.
POLLING INST. (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1322.xml?ReleaseID=1570
(reporting that in the bellwether state of Ohio, “[v]oters oppose legislation . . . that
would limit the ability of public workers to collectively bargain”).
See, e.g., Lydia Saad, More Americans Back Unions Than Governors in
State Disputes, GALLUP (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/146921/
Americans-Back-Unions-Governors-State-Disputes.aspx (reporting that 39% of
Americans “say [they] agree more” with the governors and 48% “say [they] agree more”
with the unions in ongoing disputes over collective bargaining and state budgets).
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and challenges to the role of teachers unions—the public sector’s most
visible organized cohort—have been issuing from the right and left alike.3
And while a consensus may be emerging among the credible commentariat
that Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker “overplayed his hand”—using a
budget crisis as a pretext for punishing unions he views as political
opponents4—the frequent portrayal of teachers and other civil servants as
members of a privileged and overpaid class who enjoy jobs for life and the
benefits of “lavish” health care and pension plans has clearly found some
traction with the viewing public, despite the considerable gap between that
image and the daily lives of most of those thus portrayed.5
But I want to argue here that the stakes in Wisconsin have less to do
with the bona fides of budget crises and benefits packages than with
something a great deal more fundamental: the struggle between democratic
governance and authoritarian control in the American workplace. I don’t
wish to overstate the parallel to events in the Middle East, where the
courage of the men and women who have joined the unprecedented wave of
antigovernment protests is nearly beyond measure. But unions give
American workers something that markets and employers seldom afford
them and that contemporary American law does not otherwise provide: a
genuine voice in important decisions about their work lives and the power
to make that voice heard. The attack on public-sector unions thus threatens
to exacerbate what is already a breathtaking “democracy deficit” in U.S.
labor relations and—should the effort gain traction and succeed—to cut
American workers altogether out of a role in workplace governance. Indeed,
now that private-sector union representation in the United States has
reached a post-World War II low of under 8%,6 the mantra of Republican

3.

4.

See, e.g., Andrew Rice, Miss Grundy Was Fired Today, N.Y. MAG., Mar. 20, 2011,
http://nymag.com/news/features/michelle-rhee-2011-3 (analyzing recent critiques of
public school teachers “from union-busting Republicans on the right and wealthy
liberals on the left”).
See, e.g., David Brooks, Op-Ed., Make Everybody Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/opinion/22brooks.html; Evan McMorris-Santoro,
The Next Union Battlefield in Ohio: The Ballot Box, TALKING POINTS MEMO
D.C. (Mar. 4, 2011, 8:36 AM), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/03/
the-next-union-battlefield-in-ohio-the-ballot-box.php.

5.

See, e.g., The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: Crisis in Dairyland
—Apocalypse
Cow
(Comedy
Central
television
broadcast
Mar.
10,
2011), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-march-10-2011/crisis-in
-dairyland---apocalypse-cow (collecting clips from Fox News and other sources
criticizing the “lavish, with a capital L, benefits” enjoyed by public school teachers who
assertedly work “a part-time job, [where] they’re done at 2:30”).

6.

Compare News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union
Members—2010, at 7 tbl.3 (Jan. 21, 2011) [hereinafter BLS News Release], available at
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state officials that government should be “run like a business”7 may well
portend a clean and decidedly non-union sweep for the public-sector
workforce as well.
Yet in my experience there aren’t many folks in the legal academy—or
the legal profession more generally—who understand public-sector labor
relations well enough to know just what to make out of the current crisis;
indeed, there aren’t that many labor law professors who have much
familiarity with the subject, though Lord knows of late we’ve been
scurrying to get up to speed. So in order to lay out my argument that
what’s at stake here is the survival of workplace democracy—and not, as
even many progressives tend to assume, just another stage in the decline of
a relic better suited to mines and factories than to the contemporary
economy—I am going to need to provide a quick overview of some
important points about public-sector union representation.
This Essay will therefore proceed as follows. In Part I, I explain why
public-sector labor relations law is for most of us terra incognita, attributing
the information gap to the absence of focus on public-sector issues in U.S.
labor law teaching and scholarship. In Part II, I identify an important
consequence of that gap: the failure of most contemporary accounts of the
steep decline in private-sector union density to reckon with an equally
dramatic increase in public-sector union density, contrasting fortunes that
offer strong support for the view that labor law itself has played a robust
role in whether and when American workers are able to secure an organized
voice in the workplace. In Part III, I bring the differences between privateand public-sector labor law into focus and compare the union density
figures with polling and survey data on the attitudes of American
workers—union and non-union alike—to support my claim of a “democracy
deficit” in workplace governance. In Part IV, I examine the details of the
recent anti-union initiatives in Wisconsin and elsewhere and the likely
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (reporting that 2010 private-sector
union representation is 7.7%), with Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership in U.S. Fell
to a 70-Year Low Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
01/22/business/22union.html (putting post-World War II unionization at 35%).
7.

See, e.g., John O’Connor, Senate Panel OKs Giving Governor More Power, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 25, 2011, http://www.thestate.com/2011/03/25/1750365/
senate-panel-oks-giving-governor.html (quoting a spokesman for South Carolina
Governor Nikki Haley as suggesting that she is seeking “to run[] state government
like a business”); Press Release, Scott Walker for Wisconsin Governor,
Walker
Outlines
Blueprint
To
Bring
250,000
Jobs
to
Wisconsin
(Sept. 16, 2010), available at http://www.scottwalker.org/press-release/2010/09/
walker-outlines-blueprint-bring-250000-jobs-wisconsin (describing constituents as
“customers” and suggesting that parts of the state government ought “to operate more
like a business”).
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consequences for the democracy deficit if the initiatives in question stand
and spread. Part V concludes with an examination of the argument—often
(and wrongly) attributed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt—that publicsector unions promote workplace democracy at the expense of civic
democracy and popular sovereignty; I argue that precisely the opposite is
the case and that union representation for public-sector workers is a critical
feature of contemporary participatory democracy.
i. the well-kept secret of public -sector labor law:
its causes and cure
Simply put, public-sector labor law is a well-kept secret because U.S.
labor law scholars—not exactly a growth industry to begin with—devote
relatively little scholarly energy to it and seldom have occasion to teach it
to students. It gets very little attention in the most popular labor law
casebooks, and few law schools offer it with any frequency as a freestanding
course. To be sure, there are some important exceptions on both the
scholarly and the teaching fronts—Joe Slater, Marty Malin, and Ann
Hodges have been doing particularly thoughtful work in the field8—but for
most of us it is a bit of a black hole.
On the one hand, this is somewhat surprising. One might think that the
presence of an important sector of the U.S. economy that has been bucking
the de-unionization trend—especially a sector that has historically been an
important source of economic advancement for women and people of color
marginalized in the private sector—would be of great interest to the leftliberals and progressives who predominate in our common field. On the
other hand, our focus in recent years on the steep private-sector decline is
perhaps understandable.9 Given that crisis, turning one’s attention to the
public sector might have seemed a bit like the fellow who loses his keys in
the night but leaves the spot where he dropped them to search instead
under a nearby streetlight, reasoning that it is so much brighter there.

8.

9.

42

See, e.g., MARTIN H. MALIN, JOSEPH E. SLATER & ANN C. HODGES, PUBLIC SECTOR
EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2011); JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC
WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900-62 (2004);
Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector
Labor Law Spectrum, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 735 (2009); Martin H. Malin, The
Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369 (2009).
See, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION
TO CO-REGULATION (2010); Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law,
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 (2008).
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A second reason for the gap is that public-sector labor law is not an easy
“thing” to study. Since the private sector in the United States is for the
most part governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)10 and
administered by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) with
appellate review by the federal courts,11 labor scholars who wish to study
the field know just where to look, at least when it comes to the law on the
books. By contrast, public-sector employees—federal, state, and local—are
expressly excluded from NLRA coverage.12 Federal employees have their
own labor relations statute (the Federal Labor Relations Act),13 and state
and local employees—who make up the vast majority of U.S. public-sector
workers14—are governed by labor relations laws that vary from state to
state.
That variance can be substantial. At one end of the spectrum, a handful
of states prohibit public-sector collective bargaining altogether;15 at the
other, a somewhat larger group (but still a small minority) of states not only
authorize public-sector collective bargaining but take the further,
controversial step of permitting public employees to strike.16 Moreover, as
the recent developments in Wisconsin and elsewhere remind us, labor law at
the state level is very much a moving target, in stark contrast to the
NLRA, which has proven virtually impossible to amend for the past half
century.17 Given the multiplicity of sources and the diversity and
malleability of content, it is far more difficult for scholars and teachers to
paint the public sector with a broad brush. Indeed, there is no Model Public
Employees Relations Act or Restatement of Public Sector Labor Law to
work with—though one is tempted to add that the latter may be a good
thing lest public-sector workers suddenly find themselves to be employed
“at will.”18 At the same time, focusing like a laser beam on local law is not a

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006)).
See NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (describing the structure and the functions of the NLRB); id.
§ 160(e)-(f) (outlining appellate review).
See id. § 152(2)-(3).
5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7106, 7111-7123, 7131-7135 (2006).
BLS News Release, supra note 6, at 8 tbl.3 (reporting a combined total of 17.5 million
state and local employees versus 3.6 million federal employees).
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (2009).
See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 315/17 (2011); 115 id. § 5/13(b).

17.

See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1527 (2002).

18.

See Matthew W. Finkin et al., Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of
Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 93,
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great strategy for securing tenure or enhancing the curriculum of a law
school with national aspirations.
The longstanding habit of viewing private-sector labor relations in
relative isolation has had less than salutary consequences for our
understanding of one of the most important developments in our field. But
whatever the reasons for this past neglect, “we are all badgers now”19 and
labor law scholars are certainly paying more attention in the wake of what
is happening in Wisconsin and other states.
ii. a tale of two demographics
Consider the recently released figures from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics revealing that in 2010 union representation in the private sector
fell to 7.7%—a remarkable decline from a post-World War II peak in excess
of a third of the working population20—while representation among publicsector workers, virtually non-existent until the late 1950s, hit 40%.21
Indeed, the number of public-sector union workers in the United States now
exceeds the number in the private sector, a striking development given that
public-sector employees comprise less than 17% of the American
workforce.22
What are we to make of these figures? As suggested earlier, the
attention of those in the labor field has been focused almost entirely on the
private-sector decline, and a variety of plausible causes have been
canvassed in the literature: the disappearance of mining and manufacturing
jobs—once the bedrock of union membership in the United States—and the
rise of a less union-friendly service economy;23 a decline in “career”

19.

20.
21.
22.

23.
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99 (2009) (critiquing job security provisions of the proposed restatement of privatesector employment law for embracing a far more robust version of the employment-atwill rule than is justified by the case law).
Stanley Fish, We’re All Badgers Now, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Mar. 21, 2011,
8:30
PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/were-all-badgers-now
(applauding the effort of the faculty at University of Illinois at Chicago to unionize in
solidarity with Wisconsin educators and other workers).
See Greenhouse, supra note 6.
BLS News Release, supra note 6, at 7-8 tbl.3.
Id. (reporting 8.4 million public-sector union workers versus 7.9 million private-sector
union workers and 21.1 million public-sector workers versus 103 million private-sector
workers).
See, e.g., Henry S. Farber & Bruce Western, Accounting for the Decline of Unions in the
Private Sector, 1973-1998, in THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED
STATES 28, 29 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2002) (arguing that “most
of the decline in the [private-sector] union membership rate is due to differential
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employment and a marked increase in outsourcing, subcontracting, and
project work;24 the ill fit between traditional union-negotiated workplace
rules and the asserted need for “flexibility” in an increasingly competitive
global economy;25 the perception that labor unions—once viewed as a
critical countervailing force to heartless employers imposing starvation
wages and onerous working conditions on a vulnerable working class—have
little role to play in the contemporary workplace, where employees enjoy
legal protection against such predations through minimum wage laws, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, and a host of other state and federal
statutes;26 and finally the flourishing of an “information” economy with socalled “knowledge” workers who neither need nor want unions since
workplace hierarchies have flattened and the conflict between capital and
labor—the motive force in traditional U.S. labor relations—has been
greatly diminished.27
There is no doubt some truth to each of these now-familiar talking
points, but there are important though less familiar counterfactuals. The
supposedly union-resistant service economy, for example, is proving to be
surprisingly fertile ground for organizing, as contemporary unions enjoy
impressive successes in a variety of service industries including
hospitality,28 security services,29 custodial and landscaping work,30 and
home health care.31 Moreover, many of these successes have occurred in the

24.
25.
26.

27.
28.
29.

30.
31.

employment growth rates in the union and nonunion sectors,” specifically in serviceproducing rather than goods-producing sectors and professional and managerial
occupations rather than blue-collar occupations).
See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 51-66 (2004).
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., James T. Bennett & Jason E. Taylor, Labor Unions: Victims of Their Own
Political Success?, in THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 23, at 245, 247 (making the case that this “substitution hypothesis”
helps explain union membership decline).
See, e.g., ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003).
See, e.g., HOTEL WORKERS RISING, http://www.hotelworkersrising.org (last visited June
21, 2011).
See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Office Security Guards Reach Union Accord, N.Y. TIMES:
CITY ROOM BLOG (June 25, 2008, 5:15 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/
2008/06/25/office-security-guards-reach-union-accord.
See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Janitors’ Drive in Texas Gives Hope to Unions, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/28/national/28janitor.html.
See, e.g., Stu Schneider, Victories for Home Health Care Workers: Home Care Workers Get
Organized, DOLLARS & SENSE, Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 25-27, available at
http://www.directcareclearinghouse.org/download/homehealthcare.pdf.
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context of outsourced and subcontracted work—the Justice for Janitors
campaign in Los Angeles and other cities is a prime example32—and
“project” work has posed no bar to longtime union representation for
musicians, actors, and construction employees working out of union hiring
halls.33 As for the assumed ill fit between unions and “knowledge” workers,
it’s worth noting that over 40% of teachers and others in the education,
training, and library occupations currently enjoy union representation,
constituting what is by some distance the most unionized occupational
cohort in the entire U.S. economy.34 Meanwhile, numerous studies reveal
widespread and flagrant violations of minimum wage and workplace safety
regulations among firms employing low-wage workers,35 and the relentless
incantation of the “flexibility” mantra—a.k.a. the effort to shift the risks of
the business cycle to workers and their families by eliminating job
security—is evidence of a deep and abiding conflict between the voracious
demands of capital and the all-too-human needs of labor.
In sum, there are reasons to doubt the seemingly widespread assumption
that the principal reason for the decline in union density is that American
workers don’t want or need unions because they have little role to play in
the contemporary economy. Indeed, there is another account, one that has
its provenance in work done in the 1980s by Paul Weiler, who argued that
the principal reason for the decline in private-sector union density is that
U.S. employers are increasingly breaking the law to thwart union
organizing efforts and that American labor law does little to deter or to
remedy the unlawful efforts.36 Other scholars have occasionally taken up
this theme—Cindy Estlund expanded on it to particularly powerful effect a

32.
33.

34.
35.

36.

46

Justice for Janitors, SERV. EMPS. INT’L UNION (SEIU), http://www.seiu.org/division/
property-services/justice-for-janitors (last visited June 21, 2011).
See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation, CAREER GUIDE TO
INDUSTRIES, 2010-11 EDITION, http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs031.htm (last modified
Dec. 17, 2009) (noting that unions play an important role in the performing arts sector);
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Motion Picture and Video Industries, CAREER GUIDE TO
INDUSTRIES, 2010-11 EDITION, http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs038.htm (last modified
Dec. 17, 2009) (“Virtually all film production companies and television networks sign
contracts with union locals that require the employment of workers according to union
contracts.”); BLS News Release, supra note 6, at 7 tbl.3 (showing that the union
representation rate in the construction industry is 14%, a full six percentage points
above the private-sector average).
See BLS News Release, supra note 6, at 7-8 tbl.3.
See, e.g., ESTLUND, supra note 9, at 64-67 (examining violations of health and safety
laws); Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2010) (examining violations of minimum wage laws).
Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
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few years back37—and a rich body of empirical work has likewise developed
to support the lawless employer/toothless law thesis.38 But in most of this
work the public sector has been ignored or given the shortest of shrift,39 and
the contention here is that if we view the American workforce as a whole—
taking the private and public sectors together—the case for the Weiler
thesis is considerably strengthened.
iii. what’ s law got to do with it?
There are two critical differences between the rules that govern labor
relations in the private sector and those in the public setting, and they go a
long way toward explaining the contrasting fortunes of private- and publicsector unions. Simply put, private-sector workers risk their jobs when they
try to organize a union and—if they are successful in their organizing
efforts—they must risk their jobs a second time to secure gains through
collective bargaining. In the public sector, by contrast, employees almost
invariably engage in both union organizing and collective bargaining
without exposing themselves to such risks.
A. The Risk of Discharge for Union Organizers and Supporters
On the organizing front, private-sector workers are far more vulnerable
to retaliatory discharge at the hands of an anti-union employer than their
public-sector counterparts. While the law on the books protects both
private-sector and public-sector employees against retaliation for union

37.
38.

39.

See Estlund, supra note 17.
See Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of
Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 684-85 (2010) (collecting and analyzing
studies).
The rare exception is the work of (naturally) a public-sector labor law specialist, on
which I will frequently draw in Part III of the Essay. See Joseph E. Slater, The
“American Rule” that Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 53 (2007)
[hereinafter Slater, American Rule]; Joseph E. Slater, Lessons from the Public Sector:
Suggestions and a Caution, 95 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Slater,
Lessons]; see also Tom Juravich & Kate Bronfenbrenner, Preparing for the Worst:
Organizing and Staying Organized in the Public Sector, in ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW
RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 262 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998)
(comparing employer anti-union conduct in private- versus public-sector union
campaigns).
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support,40 the overwhelming majority of private-sector employees work
under the employment-at-will rule, meaning in essence that their employer
can fire them at any time for any reason not prohibited by law. As I have
argued elsewhere, as a result, a discharged organizer faces an uphill battle in
establishing that the employer’s motive in firing her was to thwart the
campaign.41 An employer so accused will ordinarily assert reasons for the
dismissal that have nothing to do with the union—reasons such as
insubordination or malingering, though under the “any” reason standard of
employment-at-will the possibilities here are by definition virtually
limitless.42 To be sure, in good years the NLRB is quite adept at seeing
through pretexts, but the resulting process—from the filing of a charge of
anti-union dismissal through complaint and hearing to judicial review—
takes an average of two or three years.43 Even if everything goes right, at
the end of it all, a successful employee is entitled to no more than
reinstatement (a frightening prospect in itself for most discharged workers)
and back pay less interim earnings.44 An employer therefore may decide
that this is a small price to pay for thwarting a union organizing effort.
According to an impressive body of empirical studies, a shocking
percentage of U.S. employers comes to precisely that calculation. One
recent study estimated that as many as one in five U.S. workers who
supports a union campaign as an “activist” is unlawfully fired for her
efforts,45 and another puts the odds at one unlawful discharge for every

40.

41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

48

In the private sector, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006) (prohibiting discharge and other
discrimination on the basis of union support); in the public sector, see, for example, 5
U.S.C. § 7116(a)(2) (importing the same rule for federal employees).
See Richard Michael Fischl, “A Domain into Which the King’s Writ Does Not Seek To
Run”: Workplace Justice in the Shadow of Employment-at-Will, in LABOUR LAW IN AN
ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES 253 (Joanne
Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl & Karl Klare eds., 2002) (analyzing the challenge of
establishing unlawful motive against the backdrop of employment-at-will).
See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1670-78 (1996).
See Sachs, supra note 9, at 2695 & n.34.
On the “dismal” success rate of reinstatement in NLRB discharge cases and the limited
monetary remedies available, see Fischl, supra note 41, at 255-57.
JOHN SCHMITT & BEN ZIPPERER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, DROPPING THE
AX: ILLEGAL FIRINGS DURING UNION ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 11 (2007), available at
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/unions_2007_01.pdf (“If we assume that
ten percent of pro-union workers are union activists, and that employers target union
activists, then we estimate [based on NLRB records of illegal firings during organizing
campaigns] that in 2005 union activists faced about an 18 percent chance of being fired
during a union-election campaign.”).
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three union campaigns.46 And while there is disagreement over the precise
frequency,47 there is no disputing that retaliatory discharges are an all-toocommon feature of private-sector union campaigns—generating between
six- and seven-thousand discriminatory dismissal charges filed with the
NLRB in a typical year48—and it is well recognized that such discharges are
highly likely to halt a union campaign in its tracks.49
The contrast to the public sector could scarcely be greater.50 Most
public-sector workers, at both the state and federal levels, enjoy the
protections of civil service law and accordingly cannot be discharged
without “just cause” or its equivalent.51 If a union organizer is fired in the
midst of a campaign, the burden is on the employer to establish that this
was not a retaliatory dismissal and that there was a good reason (not just
“any” reason) apart from the organizing campaign to fire the employee.52
Moreover, because their employer is the government, public-sector

46.

47.
48.

49.
50.
51.

52.

See Kate Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred: The Intensification of Employer Opposition to
Organizing 10 (Econ. Policy Inst., Briefing Paper No. 235, May 20, 2009), available at
http://epi.3cdn.net/edc3b3dc172dd1094f_0ym6ii96d.pdf.
For a perceptive discussion of the various studies and their significance, see Sachs, supra
note 38, at 684-85.
See NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., SEVENTY SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, at 122
tbl.2 (2007), available at http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/119/nlrb2007.pdf;
NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., SEVENTY THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2008, at 80
tbl.2 (2008), available at http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/119/nlrb2008.pdf;
NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., SEVENTY FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2009, at 94
tbl.2 (2009), available at http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/119/nlrb2009.pdf.
See Bronfenbrenner, supra note 46, at 10.
For a comprehensive analysis of the legal protections against anti-union discharge
available in the public-sector setting, see Slater, American Rule, supra note 39, at 88-90.
See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 75 (McKinney 2011) (stating that a covered public
employee “shall not be removed or otherwise subjected to any disciplinary penalty
provided in this section except for incompetency or misconduct shown after a hearing
upon stated charges pursuant to this section”); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 741.807 (West
2011) (stating that “[n]o regular employee in the classified service shall be removed
except for just cause”); WIS. STAT. § 230.34(1)(a) (2009) (“An employee with permanent
status in class or an employee who has served with the state as an assistant district
attorney for a continuous period of 12 months or more may be removed, suspended
without pay, discharged, reduced in base pay or demoted only for just cause.”). See
generally Slater, American Rule, supra note 39, at 88 (“While not all public officials are
covered by just cause rules (policy-making officials typically are not, and there is often a
probationary period for lower-level workers), the vast majority of public employees
eligible to form unions are covered by such rules.”).
See id. at 89-90.
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employees protected by civil service laws may enjoy due process rights in
discharge cases that are not available against private-sector employers, and
accordingly such employees will rarely face the sort of summary dismissal
permissible in the private sector under employment-at-will.53 As a result of
these protections, retaliatory discharges for union organizing are
comparatively rare in the public sector.54 To be sure, this is in no small part
the product of a culture in which public employers generally proceed with
caution in dismissal cases, but the underlying legal protection has no doubt
played a large role in the development of that culture.
B. Job Security Risks During Collective Bargaining
When employees in the private sector are successful in organizing a
union, they face further risks to their jobs when the union and their
employer commence collective bargaining over wages, hours, and working
conditions. A private-sector union’s principal source of bargaining power is
the strike—the collective withholding of labor by the employees—or a
credible threat that a strike will be mounted. This is a difficult undertaking
in the best of circumstances, since striking employees and their families will
have to make do without their paychecks or (in the vast majority of states)
unemployment benefits for the duration of the strike, and the limited strike
benefits available from most unions are nowhere near enough to make ends
meet. But of far greater concern to most employees is the very real prospect
that the strike will cost them their jobs.
This threat is a result of yet another gap between the law on the books
and the law in action, for the NLRA explicitly protects the right to strike
and proscribes employer interference with that right.55 But the courts have
interpreted the provisions in question to permit employers to hire
“permanent replacements” for striking workers—replacements whom the
employer is free to retain come the end of the strike.56 The strikers, by
contrast, have no right to re-employment unless and until there are poststrike vacancies in the employer’s workforce.57 Particularly during periods
of economic stagnation or decline, the prospect of striking and thus risking
53.
54.

55.
56.
57.

50

See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
See Juravich & Bronfenbrenner, supra note 39, at 257 tbl.16.2 (estimating the frequency
of discharge in a public-sector organizing campaign at 5% versus 30% for the private
sector).
See NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1), 163 (2006).
The seminal case is NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
See, e.g., NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. Servs., Inc., 700 F.2d 385, 389 (7th Cir.
1983).
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a job you have now for benefits that your union may or may not be able to
achieve at the bargaining table—and which you may or may not be around
to enjoy—is daunting, to say the least.
To be sure, employers have enjoyed the right to hire permanent
replacements in the face of a strike since the earliest days of the NLRA,58
but studies confirm a dramatic increase in the frequency of recourse to that
right since the late 1970s,59 coincident with the steep decline in privatesector density over the past three decades. The resultant effect on
bargaining success rates has been devastating: a recent study reveals that
nearly two-thirds of U.S. private-sector unions are unable to secure a
contract within a year of recognition and that nearly half are unable to
achieve one at all.60
The contrast to the public sector is once again stark. In most states,
public-sector unions do not (and indeed cannot) strike in support of
bargaining demands; instead, a union’s source of power at the bargaining
table is a system of “interest arbitration.”61 Although the details vary from
state to state, the basic format works like this: if the employer and union
fail to reach an agreement on a collective contract, a neutral arbitrator
conducts proceedings in which the parties present evidence and arguments
for their respective bargaining positions and then renders a decision,
typically guided by such factors as comparable pay rates for similarly
situated workers and the budgetary constraints on the government
employer.62 In this setting, it is data and evidence, persuasive arguments,
and reasonable proposals—rather than a self-immolating strike—that
secures a union’s goals in collective bargaining.
And even in the minority of states that do authorize public-sector
strikes, for a variety of reasons—including civil service protections, state
labor relations board rulings, and the previously described culture of job
security in the public sector—public-sector workers seldom, if ever, face the
prospect of permanent replacement in the course of a strike, eliminating for

58.

See Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. 333.

59.

See, e.g., Michael H. Leroy, Regulating Employer Use of Permanent Striker Replacements:
Empirical Analysis of NLRA and RLA Strikes 1935-1991, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 169, 189-91 (1995).
See JOHN-PAUL FERGUSON & THOMAS A. KOCHAN, SEQUENTIAL FAILURES IN WORKERS’
RIGHT TO ORGANIZE 1 (2008), available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/
dmdocuments/sequential_failures_in_workers_right_to_organize_3_25_2008.pdf.
Slater, Lessons, supra note 39.
See id.

60.

61.
62.
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them as well the threat to job security faced by their private-sector
counterparts.63
C. The Private/Public Difference and the Democracy Deficit
In sum, for the past several decades we have in effect been running a
natural experiment to determine the difference between union density rates
for employees who must risk their jobs to secure organizing rights and
bargaining gains and those who can succeed on both fronts at relatively
little risk to the prospect of continued employment. There should be no
surprise that the figure for the former is less than one-fifth of the magnitude
of the latter.
That this difference represents a “democracy deficit”—meaning that the
private-sector figures do not reflect a decreased desire among employees for
union representation but are instead the result of unlawful employer efforts
to thwart that desire—is further buttressed by empirical work exploring the
attitude of American workers toward unionization. In the well-known and
frequently cited study What Workers Want—the product of a
comprehensive multi-year survey conducted among private-sector workers
in the United States—Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers reported that 32%
of workers who were not represented by unions wished they were and that
90% of those who were wanted to stay that way.64 Taking the figures
together—at a time when union density was running just over 10%—the
authors concluded that the statistics “implied a desired rate of privatesector unionization of 44%.”65 Surely it is no coincidence that, in the one
sector of the American economy where workers don’t face the threat of job
loss for their union efforts, union density rates closely approximate that
“desired” rate of unionization, and that employees who do face such a
threat are organizing at a much lower rate.
It is of course possible that there are other differences between the
private-sector and public-sector workforces that might account for the
dramatically different degrees of unionization, but it is difficult to imagine
just what those might be. The notion, for example, that public-sector
workers are more “liberal” politically—and therefore more inclined to join
unions—is undermined a bit by the fact that two of the most heavily
63.

See Slater, American Rule, supra note 39, at 86 (finding no case of a legally authorized
permanent replacement in the public sector).

64.

RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 17, 96-98 (2d ed. 2006).
Id. at 17; see also id. at 17-18 (analyzing Harris, Hart, and Zogby polling conducted
between the initial 1999 study and 2006 and concluding that the desired rate of
unionization had, if anything, increased in the interim).

65.

52

wisconsin and the assault on workplace democracy

unionized occupations in the public sector are police and firefighters,66 not
exactly strongholds for liberal sentiments. The notion that demographics
play a major role is likewise difficult to sustain; for example, overall women
are somewhat less likely than men to be represented by a union,67 but they
predominate in the field of education, the most unionized occupational
cohort of all.68 Indeed the sheer variety of blue collar, pink collar, and white
collar occupations in the public sector—together with the fact that two of
the largest occupational cohorts (education and health care) traverse the
public/private boundary—suggest that there’s nothing inherent in the
characteristics of the workforces in question which would predict strongly
different views on unionization. There is, to be sure, one major difference
with a lot of explanatory power: private-sector employers are nearly five
times more likely than their public-sector counterparts to mount an
aggressive effort against a union campaign and six times more likely to
break the law while doing so.69 But that’s precisely the difference that the
Weiler thesis would predict.70
There is thus ample reason to infer that the public-sector union density
figure is a far superior measure of the appetite of American workers for
union representation than the private-sector figure, but—given my
argument here—it’s fair to ask whether a desire for union representation is
the same as a desire for workplace democracy. As it happens, the argument
for that correlation is even stronger in the case of public-sector workers
than it is for their private-sector counterparts. Here’s why.
One of the principal benefits of union representation for private-sector
workers is job security, for unionized workers almost invariably enjoy the
benefits of collectively bargained “just cause” protection,71 in contrast to
non-unionized private-sector workers who are overwhelmingly “at will.”
Private-sector union workers also stand to gain substantially from the socalled “union wage premium,” which is estimated to push private-sector

66.

See BLS News Release, supra note 6, at 7 tbl.3 (reporting union density of 37% among
protective service occupations).

67.

See id. at 5 tbl.1 (12% versus 14% in 2010).
Compare id. at 7-8 tbl.3 (showing a union density rate of 41% in education, training, and
library occupations), with U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 14 tbl.11 (2010), available at www.bls.gov/
cps/cpsaat11.pdf (reporting that 74% of employees in those occupations are women).
See Juravich & Bronfenbrenner, supra note 39, at 266-67 tbl.16.2.

68.

69.
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See Weiler, supra note 36.
See LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE: A COURSEBOOK 249, 258 (2000)
(reporting that 92% of private-sector collective-bargaining agreements contain a “just
cause” provision).
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wage and benefits 15-20% higher than the wage and benefit package of nonunion but otherwise similarly situated workers.72 Indeed, the increase in
labor costs is a principal reason that many employers give for opposing
unions.73 The support for union representation in the private sector may
accordingly have less to do with a generalized desire for workplace
democracy than for what collective worker voice buys them—i.e., job
security and a better pay package; indeed, the Freeman and Rogers survey
confirms that union workers are far more likely to cite improved pay and
working conditions as the principal benefit of union representation than
having a say in workplace governance.74
By contrast, as noted earlier most public-sector workers already enjoy
“just cause” protection under civil service laws, and their ability to bargain
over benefits is often narrowly circumscribed; in most states, for example,
public-sector pensions are established via legislation rather than collective
bargaining, and in the federal sector employees can’t bargain over wages or
benefits at all.75 So what’s the payoff in union representation for such
workers?
A report in the New York Times about the recent union representation
vote among the airport screeners working for the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) is revealing in this respect, contrasting the prospect
of participation in workplace governance through union representation with
the unilateral authority of the non-union employer.76 Why, the article asks,
would the screeners want to unionize, since their union (like most federal
employee unions) won’t be able to bargain over wages, health benefits, or
pensions and will also operate with additional restrictions (such as the
preclusion of bargaining over job qualifications and discipline standards) in
the name of “national security”? The answers offered by interviewed union
supporters speak volumes. One employee, a nine-year veteran of the

72.

73.

74.

See, e.g., David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, What Effect Do Unions Have on Wages
Now and Would Freeman and Medoff Be Surprised?, in WHAT DO UNIONS DO? A
TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 79, 86, 88 tbl.4.3 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman
eds., 2007).
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against the Employee Free Choice Act 24-25
(Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 452, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337185.
FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 64, at 107 (noting that 48% of union workers identified
“[b]etter pay/working conditions” as “the most important thing a union does for its
members” versus 11% who chose “[m]ore say in workplace issues”).

75.

See Joseph E. Slater, Public Sector Labor in the Age of Obama, 86 IND. L.J. (forthcoming
2011).
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Steven Greenhouse, Unions Woo Airport Security Screeners, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/16/business/16screeners.html.
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agency, explained that “screeners ‘don’t have any voice on the job.’”
Another said, “We’re the black sheep of the federal government. There are
no work floor regulations for us so when there’s an issue, management’s
attitude is: ‘It’s our way or the highway.’” And a third—an army veteran
who had opposed unionization when he was hired but had come to a
different view on the job—reported that “management staff treats us like
we’re children.”77
In a memorable presentation at a labor law conference some years back,
Kris Rondeau—one of the leading figures in the successful union campaign
among Harvard’s clerical workers during the 1970s and 1980s—sounded
those themes and made the case for union representation in the most
succinct and eloquent form I have ever encountered:
[We told our colleagues] that self-respecting adults represent
themselves in all things. And to the extent any American worker can
look around wherever he or she is, they see successful people
representing themselves. They see that there’s no such thing as
someone who they consider successful in their lives not requiring
that they will be in the room where decisions are made about their
lives.78
As suggested earlier, it may be the case that employees who already enjoy
the benefits of union representation take “be[ing] in the room” for granted,
but Freeman and Rogers confirm that unrepresented workers experience a
deep and abiding “influence gap” between their desire for having a say in
workplace governance and the willingness of employers to satisfy that
desire.79
In other countries, there are alternative legal mechanisms available to
empower worker voice, from works councils to health and safety
committees, but efforts to explore such initiatives during the Clinton

77.

78.

79.

Id. Of the nearly 20,000 TSA employees who voted in the ensuing election, well over
80% supported union representation. Because the union support was divided nearly
equally between two labor organizations—the American Federation of Government
Employees and the National Treasury Employees Union—a runoff election will be
conducted to determine the organization that will serve as the screeners’ bargaining
representative. Steven Greenhouse, Airport Screeners Need Runoff to Pick a Union, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/business/21screener.html.
Kris Rondeau, Remarks at the Critical Legal Studies Conference: Can the 30s and the
60s Equal the 90s? (Jan. 1989) (recording on file with author). On the Harvard
campaign more generally, see JOHN HOERR, WE CAN’T EAT PRESTIGE: THE WOMEN
WHO ORGANIZED HARVARD (1997).
FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 64, at 76-77.
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Administration foundered in the face of steadfast opposition (and not a
little red-baiting) from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other employer
representatives.80 As a result, under U.S. law a union is the only form of
representation that is, as a practical matter, open to American workers, and
the public sector is the one place where that form of representation has been
flourishing—the one place where workers, who clearly desire a voice in
workplace governance, enjoy a right to secure such a voice that is available
in practice and not just on paper. The recent efforts in Wisconsin and other
states to deprive workers of that right thus ought to be viewed as a serious
threat to what is all too rapidly becoming the last bastion of democratic
governance in the American workplace.
iv. madison -ian democracy 2.0
So what exactly is going on in Wisconsin and other states where publicsector unions appear to be in for a serious challenge? To keep an already too
long Essay from getting much longer, I’ll focus here exclusively on
Wisconsin, though the provisions of the bill in question are similar in broad
effect to the law enacted in Ohio at the end of March and to the executive
orders issued a few years back by Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels reversing
a decade and a half of collective bargaining practice in that state.81
A. Parsing the New Law
As of this writing, Wisconsin’s legislation—signed by Governor Scott
Walker in March after a now-infamous journey through the state
legislature—has been given the green light by the state supreme court, but
a coalition of unions has filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging many of
its provisions; in the meantime, recall elections have been scheduled for
July for six Republican senators who supported the Governor’s bill and

80.
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For background on the Chamber of Commerce campaign, see generally John Logan, The
Clinton Administration and Labor Law: Was Comprehensive Reform Ever a Realistic
Possibility?, 28 J. LABOR RES. 609, 619-20, 622-23 (2007).
S.B. 5, 129th Gen. Assemb. § 4117.08 (Ohio 2011) (codified as amended
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three Democrats who opposed it, and the possibility of a differently
constituted state senate may not bode well for the law’s future, irrespective
of what eventually happens in the courts.82 So the final chapter of this story
is far from written.
Broadly speaking, the law seeks to accomplish four discrete ends: (1)
eliminating collective bargaining altogether for some categories of workers;
(2) eliminating or limiting collective bargaining for most of the rest of the
public sector workforce with respect to particular bargaining subjects; (3)
requiring an annual vote by employees to re-authorize bargaining by each
state union; and (4) prohibiting the right of unions to secure the payment of
representation fees via paycheck deduction. I will briefly address each in
turn.
(1) The law eliminates collective bargaining altogether for home health
care workers, family child care workers, employees of University of
Wisconsin hospitals and clinics, and faculty and staff at the University of
Wisconsin.83
(2) For the remaining public-sector workers, collective bargaining is
eliminated altogether for working conditions and non-wage benefits (such as
health care coverage and pensions).84 Although bargaining over wages is
still permitted, wage increases will be approved (if at all) on an annual basis
and capped at the rise in the Consumer Price Index.85
(3) Employees in every union will be required to vote annually on
whether to continue such representation,86 a change from the former
practice—and the practice followed in virtually every other private- and
public-sector setting in the United States—of certifying continuing

82.

83.
84.
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See Wisconsin v. Fitzgerald, No. 2011AP613-LV & 2011AP765-W (Wis. June 14,
2011),
available at http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/opinion/DisplayDocument.html?
content=html&seqNo=66078. On the federal suit brought by the unions, see Don
Walker & Patrick Marley, Unions Seek To Overturn Court Order Reinstating Collectivebargaining Law, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 15, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/
news/statepolitics/123921154.html. On the recall efforts—which are also under legal
challenge—see Tom Tolan, Patrick Marley & Jason Stein, Recall Elections Set for 3
Democratic Senators, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 15, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/
news/statepolitics/123516934.html. Because of the legal challenge that eventuated in the
state supreme court decision, the law has not yet been published; accordingly, citations
here are to the bill as passed by the state legislature and signed by the governor. A.B.
11, 2011 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Wis. 2011) [hereinafter Wisc. Bill].
Wisc. Bill §§ 10, 12, 30, 45, 79, 80, 82, 84, 90-93, 164,-65, 186, 188, 196-97, 209, 229, 265,
269, 279, 302, 304, 307, 317, 323, 335, 370, 374.
Id. §§ 95, 210, 214, 245, 262, 314.
Id. § 169.
Id. § 289.
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representation on the basis of a single initial vote and holding subsequent
votes only if employees seeking ouster come forward with evidence that a
substantial percentage desires decertification. Moreover, to secure
recertification, each union will need to win the votes of a majority of the
workers employed in the particular bargaining unit (e.g., the teachers in a
particular school district or the civil servants in a particular office) rather
than merely securing a majority from among the ballots actually cast,87 the
conventional method of measuring majority rule in union representation
elections.
(4) Finally, the new law imposes steep obstacles on the ability of publicsector unions to secure the payment of fees designed to cover the costs of
union representation in grievance proceedings, in collective bargaining, and
in other endeavors. In the private sector, this is typically accomplished by
the inclusion of two provisions in a collective-bargaining agreement: an
“agency shop” provision (which requires employees to pay reasonable
representation fees to the union as a condition of continued employment)
and a “dues checkoff” provision (which requires that the fees in question be
deducted from paychecks). In the public sector, these provisions are
frequently referred to together as a “fair share” agreement, the idea being
that each individual represented by the union must pay his or her “fair
share” of the union’s representation costs. Under the Wisconsin law, “fair
share” agreements are prohibited altogether; that is, individual employees
may no longer be required to make “fair share” payments as a condition of
employment, and government employers may no longer deduct such fees
from their paychecks.88
The likely effects of these provisions will be fairly self-evident to labor
lawyers and scholars, but for other readers a word or two describing the
devastating impacts may be in order. The provisions eliminating bargaining
rights altogether for home health care and family child care workers target
two of the most economically vulnerable occupational cohorts in the state,
and the sudden and dramatic de-unionization of faculty and others at the
University of Wisconsin will have a profound effect on governance and
morale at that institution. I’ll have something more to say about the long87.
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term benefits issue in a moment,89 but I suppose that taking that off the
table will free up unions to face the considerable institutional and logistical
burdens that will necessarily attend a “permanent campaign”90 in the face
of those annual re-certification elections, an extraordinary waste of time
and resources for all concerned—including, in an era of budget crises, the
state agency that is required to conduct all those elections.91 Indeed, it’s
worth noting that an application of the majority-of-eligible-voters test for
determining the election winner—instead of the more conventional measure
of a majority of those voting—would invalidate the results of most U.S.
political elections conducted in recent decades, strongly suggesting that
something other than a desire to promote democratic decisionmaking is at
work here. And finally, the elimination of “fair share” agreements means
that public-sector unions will predictably face the “free rider” problems
already faced by private-sector unions in right-to-work states: an inability
to collect representation fees from employees who enjoy the benefits of
collective bargaining and whom the union is nevertheless bound by law to
represent.
As many news stories and columns about these new laws have noted, the
fact that it’s Wisconsin whose laws are at stake is particularly devastating
as a symbolic matter. Wisconsin has a storied past when it comes to labor
matters, having been the first state to enact workers compensation,
unemployment benefits, and—ironically enough—collective bargaining for
public-sector workers, which it did in 1959.92 Indeed, given the state’s
strong and longstanding union tradition, those in the labor movement may
quite reasonably be concerned that if it could happen there, it could happen
with considerable ease in the many states with less union-friendly cultures.
B. Making Sense of These Initiatives
Those leading the charge for these restrictions are clearly taking a page
from the playbook of Rahm Emanuel, for they are certainly not letting the

89.
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91.
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See infra notes 102-106 and accompanying text.
Cf. SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL, THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN: INSIDE THE WORLD OF ELITE
POLITICAL OPERATIVES (1980).
See, e.g., Kevin Lee, Wisconsin Union Elections Pose Logistical Difficulties, STATEHOUSE
NEWS ONLINE.COM (Mar. 31, 2011), http://statehousenewsonline.com/2011/03/31/
wisconsin-union-elections-pose-logistical-difficulties (reporting the concerns of the
General Counsel of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission).
William Cronon, Op-Ed., Wisconsin’s Radical Break, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/opinion/22cronon.html.

59

the yale law journal online

1 2 1 :3 9

2011

financial crises faced by many states go to waste.93 In many cases, the crises
do indeed require swift and decisive action, and public-sector payrolls are
frequently a substantial part of a state budget and thus a highly plausible
target, especially when health care and pension costs are included in the
mix. And in laying the blame for budget woes at the feet of public-sector
workers—while painting an image of them as overpaid and underworked—
officials have found a receptive audience among many taxpayers who see
themselves as “footing the bill” despite their own financial crises born of job
losses, health care costs, mortgage troubles, and greatly diminished pensions
and savings.
But for a host of reasons, the bona fides of the underlying argument are
open to serious questions, and opinion polls in the wake of the Wisconsin
crisis suggest that much of the public is asking those questions.94 It is one
thing to contend that public-sector workers must “share in the sacrifices”
required by budget crises; it is another thing altogether to call for the repeal
of a half century of collective bargaining rights.
Indeed, early in the dispute, the unions in Wisconsin signaled their
willingness to meet all of the governor’s financial demands by agreeing to
make sizeable contributions to their health care and pension plans—
contributions which together amounted to a de facto pay cut in the
neighborhood of 10%,95 no small thing for working families living paycheck
to paycheck. The refusal of the Republicans to settle for those concessions
and declare victory suggests that the real target was unions rather than
budget cuts. And a provision of the Wisconsin bill that I haven’t mentioned
until now all but confirms that suspicion. The bill excludes police and
firefighters unions from all of the anti-union provisions discussed earlier—
the limitations on bargaining subjects, the annual re-election requirement,
the prohibition of “fair share” agreements—and the members of those two
unions just happened to have supported Governor Scott Walker’s campaign
for office.96
Given the circumstances, there can be little doubt that these initiatives
are payback time, driven at least in part by a desire to defund the
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See, e.g., Jeff Zeleny, Obama Weighs Quick Undoing of Bush Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
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Democratic Party, traditionally the beneficiary of sizeable campaign
contributions by organized labor. In an era when so much private-sector
organizing is among low-wage workers whose union dues cannot do much
more than cover the costs of bargaining and representation, targeting
unions of higher-income public-sector workers is a potentially effective
strategy for depleting labor’s coffers—and, not coincidentally, for silencing
the most powerful and effective voice working people have in American
politics.
But the troubling dimensions of the anti-union effort do not stop there.
The likely consequences of the Wisconsin effort for female workers in
particular are striking and difficult to ascribe to mere oversight. Women
make up the vast majority of home health care and family child-care
workers,97 the two occupations singled out for losing their collectivebargaining rights altogether. Moreover, if the pay and benefits cuts lead to
a reduction in these services, the consequences will predictably fall more
heavily on those who have traditionally provided the lion’s share of care
work in their own homes: (you guessed it) women.98 Women also comprise a
large majority of the public school teachers, librarians, and staff who form
the largest single cohort of workers hurt by the other provisions of the
Wisconsin bill,99 and they are traditionally under-represented among police
and firefighters, the two occupations exempted altogether from the
proposed restrictions.100 In view of these consequences, the refrain that
public-sector workers are “the new welfare queens”101—conjuring up the
Reagan-era image of folks living beyond their station at the expense of
hardworking taxpayers—is revealing as much for its misogynistic
undertones as it is for the ugly racial stereotypes it invokes.
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Moreover, in the larger debate that the Wisconsin crisis has provoked,
some important facts about public-sector unions are getting lost in the
crossfire. For one thing, a wealth of empirical studies demonstrates that—
for comparably educated individuals—public-sector workers are paid less
and sometimes significantly less than their counterparts in the private
sector. And those figures include the supposedly “lavish” health care and
pension benefits packages.102 Indeed, the principal effect of unionization on
pay and benefits in the public sector is egalitarian: it tends to raise the
compensation of less educated workers in lower-pay occupations at the
expense of the more highly educated professionals in the public employ, and
the relatively lower earnings of the latter thus account for the lion’s share of
the public-private differential.103 Research confirms that Wisconsin follows
precisely this pattern. Thus, public-sector workers in that state enjoy a pay
and benefits package that is on average 5% lower than that of privatesector workers with comparable education and skills. But college-educated
and especially professional employees account for most of that differential,
and workers without a high school education are compensated somewhat
more generously than their private-sector counterparts.104 It is these
vulnerable workers who thus stand to lose the most if the Wisconsin bill
becomes law.
I do not mean for a moment to minimize the serious difficulties
presented by the high cost of public-sector pension benefits in a number of
jurisdictions. To some extent, they are the result of a “perfect storm” of
factors. On the one side, there are unions doing what American unions in
the public and private sectors have always done: negotiating for a pay-andbenefit package that emphasizes long-term benefits over pay rates. On the
other, there are public officials who sought to appease union demands with
the promise of deferred benefits that some later administration would have
to worry about, and that day has finally come.
But this perfect storm can only account for so much of the current
difficulty, because in most states pensions are established by law—in many
cases, laws that predate collective bargaining and that typically cover
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public officials, managers, and non-union employees as well as union
members.105 There are some obvious abuses (such as pension “spiking,” i.e.,
basing benefits on an annual income figure inflated by overtime and other
pay strategically accrued during the final year or years of employment) that
can and should be eradicated. And there are other practices—such as early
retirement at full benefits and so-called “double-dipping” (permitting
retirees with generous benefit packages to secure employment in another
capacity for the state)—that might be justified in some circumstances (e.g.,
early retirement for firefighters, who have worked thirty years at a
dangerous and physically demanding job) but should be restricted in others
(e.g., law professors).106
Eliminating public-sector collective bargaining won’t advance such
salutary efforts; in the many states where pension rules are established by
positive law—and where the principal beneficiaries of some of the dodgier
practices are managers and other high-end employees who aren’t even union
members—it won’t address the abuses at all. Indeed, as the unfolding
drama in Wisconsin reminds us, remedial efforts are far more likely to
achieve viable and broadly acceptable results if the workers’ representatives
are made part of the process rather than banished to the sidelines.
v. conclusion: and now a word from our founder
Whatever else might be said about the current crisis, it has gratified my
sense of irony to see proponents of the restrictive legislation citing as
authority none other than Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose presidency ushered
in the New Deal and with it the Wagner Act that laid the groundwork for
the organizing rights enjoyed by private-sector workers. In passages that
have gone viral on the Internet107—lifted from a letter the President wrote
to the leader of a labor organization representing federal employees—
Roosevelt argued forcefully that “the process of collective bargaining, as
usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service”; that
“[t]he very nature and purposes of Government make it impossible for
administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual
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discussions with Government employee organizations”; and in particular
that strikes and other “militant tactics” by public-sector workers were
“unthinkable and intolerable.”108
But the full text of the letter suggests a more nuanced position than the
one implied by the quoted passages, and I lay it out here so that readers can
judge for themselves, though I have italicized two passages, which are
typically omitted and which I will emphasize in a moment:
My dear Mr. Steward:
As I am unable to accept your kind invitation to be present on the
occasion of the Twentieth Jubilee Convention of the National
Federation of Federal Employees, I am taking this method of
sending greetings and a message.
Reading your letter of July 14, 1937, I was especially interested in
the timeliness of your remark that the manner in which the
activities of your organization have been carried on during the past
two decades “has been in complete consonance with the best
traditions of public employee relationships.” Organizations of
Government employees have a logical place in Government affairs.
The desire of Government employees for fair and adequate pay,
reasonable hours of work, safe and suitable working conditions,
development of opportunities for advancement, facilities for fair and
impartial consideration and review of grievances, and other objectives of
a proper employee relations policy, is basically no different from that of
employees in private industry. Organization on their part to present their
views on such matters is both natural and logical, but meticulous
attention should be paid to the special relationships and obligations of
public servants to the public itself and to the Government.
All Government employees should realize that the process of
collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted
into the public service. It has its distinct and insurmountable
limitations when applied to public personnel management. The very
nature and purposes of Government make it impossible for
administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in
mutual discussions with Government employee organizations. The
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employer is the whole people, who speak by means of laws enacted
by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administrative
officials and employees alike are governed and guided, and in many
instances restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules
in personnel matters.
Particularly, I want to emphasize my conviction that militant
tactics have no place in the functions of any organization of
Government employees. Upon employees in the Federal service rests
the obligation to serve the whole people, whose interests and welfare
require orderliness and continuity in the conduct of Government
activities. This obligation is paramount. Since their own services
have to do with the functioning of the Government, a strike of
public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part
to prevent or obstruct the operations of Government until their
demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of
Government by those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable
and intolerable. It is, therefore, with a feeling of gratification that I
have noted in the constitution of the National Federation of Federal
Employees the provision that “under no circumstances shall this
Federation engage in or support strikes against the United States
Government.”
I congratulate the National Federation of Federal Employees the
twentieth anniversary of its founding and trust that the convention
will, in every way, be successful.
Very sincerely yours, [signature omitted in original]109
As I read the letter, Roosevelt is indeed quite clear about his opposition
to strikes by public employees, but his position on collective bargaining
seems to me to be more nuanced than the sound-bite version suggests. In
the passages I have italicized, the President expresses support in principle
for government consultation on a wide variety of matters—he specifically
mentions wages, hours, working conditions, advancement, and grievances—
with an organization representing its employees. And his point about the
differences between the public and private setting, I take it, is not that
collective bargaining and contractual commitments on such topics should
be prohibited in the former but rather—turning now to the second italicized
passage—that the authority of “administrative officials” to make such
commitments was bounded by law, evincing a concern that the officials
109.
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involved in “personnel management” are not acting of their own accord but
answer instead (as the saying goes) to a higher authority. Thus, he
contends, their authority is “governed and guided, and in many instances
restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules in personnel
matters.”
But he has chosen his words carefully here—he knows how to say
“unthinkable and intolerable” but instead he says “governed,” “guided,”
and “restricted,” even circumscribing the last with an adverbial phrase (“in
many instances”), which suggests that “restriction” is not the rule but the
exception. The punchline is that invoking President Roosevelt as an
implacable opponent of public-sector bargaining on the basis of the letter in
question is not an entirely convincing enterprise. It is also somewhat
difficult to square with the legislation he had signed just a few years earlier
creating the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which authorized a fairly
robust form of collective bargaining for federal employees.110
Two final thoughts. First, in point of fact, it would not trouble me to
learn that a President who supported collective bargaining rights for
private-sector workers had a different view when it came to the public
sector. A few years back, I witnessed first-hand what happens when a
charismatic University President—who had previously served with
distinction as the Secretary of Health and Human Services under a
Democratic President—faced the prospect of a union organizing campaign
among janitors and landscapers who worked for poverty-level wages and
enjoyed nothing in the way of either health or human services from the
university and its labor contractor, and it wasn’t pretty.111 It therefore
would not surprise me to learn that a liberal icon who voiced strong support
for the rights of workers generally had a rather different view of such rights
when they were exercised closer to home. Like the University President,
President Roosevelt was after all an employer. And in my own experience
there is no leader more dreadful to work for than one who is dazzled by the
righteousness of his or her mission, whatever its political skew. Indeed, the
notion that public administration is filled to the brim with do-gooder
liberals who don’t have the heart to stand up to their workers is surely wide
of the mark; the workers who toil in their service may be the ones who need
a union and a strong say in their work lives the most.
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The second and final point comes full circle to my basic argument—
what’s at stake in Wisconsin is workplace democracy. There is a counterargument, of course, that public-sector bargaining is anti-democratic, that
it grants governing power to an institution that is neither elected by nor
answerable to the sovereign citizens. That’s certainly one way to read
President Roosevelt’s cautions, and it is a school of thought that has
enjoyed acceptance over the years in some formidable scholarly and
intellectual circles.112
But I confess that I’ve always had a difficult time understanding that
point, since public officials bargain with unelected institutions all the
time—defense contractors, office supply companies, landlords, and the host
of other firms that provide goods or services to the government. Why is it
problematic to bargain with workers but not with firms? If the vice is
thought to lie in the fact that it’s collective bargaining, then we would do
well to recall the central lesson in Justice Holmes’s brilliant dissent in
Vegelahn v. Guntner113: capital is collective too.
A related and more familiar argument is that unionized public-sector
workers get “two bites at the apple”—i.e., the deployment of union power
in the selection of the very officials with whom their unions will bargain. To
be sure, there is once again a parallel to other government contractors, and
so long as we live in a world in which corporate contributors enjoy a
considerable capacity to shape the scope and direction of our politics, it
seems to me that the countervailing voice provided by public and privatesector unions on behalf of working people is a necessary and undeniable
good. Indeed, the employees whose union rights are under attack in
Wisconsin—in particular, the women providing home health care and
family child care who have lost their bargaining rights altogether; the
teachers in the elementary and secondary schools whose rights to bargain
over pay, health care, and pension benefits have been greatly curtailed; and
the workers without high school degrees who have gained the most
materially from collective bargaining—are, by any fair measure, greatly
under-represented groups in American politics. The notion that the
amplified voice that union representation has afforded them undermines
democracy—meaning the democracy we actually have rather than the New
England town meeting we might imagine—strikes me as singularly
unpersuasive.
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Moreover, it seems to me that the arguments against public-sector
bargaining ultimately rest on a cramped view of proper governance—of
commands issuing from the sovereign—rather than a dialogic one far more
compatible with the complexity of the administrative state and democracy
on the ground. Indeed, it sounds a lot like running a government as if it
were a business. But in the American workplace, the notion of governance
as commands issuing from the sovereign is the problem; democracy is the
solution.
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